The Rise of AI Agents Are Fueling the Insider Risk

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Agenda

1. Insider are already the greatest Risk
2. The Rise of the Agentic Enterprise
3. Fueling the Insider Risk

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Insider Risks Now Outweigh External

64% of respondents identify insiders — whether malicious or compromised — as a more serious risk than external actors.



42%
Malicious Insiders

22%
Compromised Insiders

36%
External Threat Actors

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Security Operations Was Built for Humans.

The Enterprise Is Now Powered by AI Agents.

AI Agents Create a New Insider Threat Class

AI Powered Attackers Multiply the Threat Surface

SOC Noise is Outpacing Human Capacity

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AI Agents Expand Insider Risk At Machine Speed

- ✓ **Expanded access:** Agents use enterprise credentials to access sensitive systems.
- ✓ **Faster Impact:** Machine speed actions scale mistakes, fraud, or misuse.
- ✓ **Privilege Misuse:** Compromised agents behave like trusted insiders.
- ✓ **Visibility Gap:** Most security teams cannot distinguish human activity from agent activity.

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Sure, Agents are Easily Deceived



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But the Guardrails Seemed Simple!



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Infosecurity Magazine

Microsoft Copilot

Begins with a **prompt injection** delivered through a **malicious email** or shared document.

This injection prompts Microsoft 365 Copilot to search for additional emails and documents **without user consent**.

The attacker can then use invisible Unicode characters to embed sensitive information within seemingly benign hyperlinks. When a user clicks on these links, the embedded **data is transmitted to a third-party server controlled by the attacker**.

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SIGN IN / UP The Register

AI + ML 21

Slack AI can be tricked into leaking data from private channels via prompt injection

Whack yakety-yak app chaps rapped for security crack

Thomas Claburn Wed 21 Aug 2024 // 09:23 UTC

Slack AI, an assistive service add-on available to users of Salesforce's team messaging service, is **vulnerable to prompt injection**, according to security firm PromptArmor.

The core problem identified by PromptArmor is that **Slack allows user queries to fetch data from both public and private channels**, including public channels that the user has not joined.

The **LLM pulls the attacker's prompt into the context window** and Slack AI dutifully renders the injected message as a clickable authentication link in the user's Slack environment. Clicking on the link sends the API … **where it becomes accessible in the attacker's web server log.**

slack By salesforce

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These guardrails aren’t working!

Prompt Injection: Unsolved in 2026

Prompt Injections Loom Large Over ChatGPT's Atlas Browser

It's the law of unintended consequences: equipping browsers with agentic AI opens the door to an exponential volume of prompt injections.

Alexander Culafi, Senior News Writer, Dark Reading
November 26, 2025

AI browsers face a security flaw as inevitable as death and taxes

Agentic features open the door to data exfiltration or worse

Tue 28 Oct 2025 // 12:46 UTC

CYBERCRIME

OpenAI admits AI browsers face unsolvable prompt attacks

Why AI browsers remain risky

By **Kurt Knutsson, CyberGuy Report** · **Fox News**

Published January 4, 2026 12:10pm EST

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Why Guardrails Fail

Prompts mix data and instructions

LLMs are too smart for their own good

- Different Character Encodings
- Data Compression
- Emojis
- Invisible characters
- Foreign Language
- In images and video

New Agentic View

ASI01:
Agent Goal Hijack

ASI03:
Identity and Privilege Abuse

ASI09:
Human-Agent Trust Exploitation

ASI10:
Rogue Agents



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Maybe the problem is these bots are more like humans than we thought…

A Look at Insider Threat

The Most Important Threat Class We Don’t Talk About Enough

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AI is Already Increasing the Threat

- **92% of respondents** are already seeing AI increase the impact of insider attacks or know it's coming.
- **5% believe** AI won't impact insider attacks.
- **3% are seeing** a decrease in the effectiveness.



36%
Yes, significantly

38%
Yes, somewhat

18%
will increase effectiveness

5%
no expectation

3%
decreasing the effectiveness of insider attacks

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Insider Threats Have Evolved

Traditional Insider Threats

- Malicious
- Negligent
- Compromised

AI Agent Insiders

- Malfunctioning
- Misaligned
- Subverted

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We deploy cyber tools to both protect and monitor human employees

Insider threat programs need telemetry and analytics

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Why Can’t We Do This for Agents?

Welcome to Agent Behavior Analytics

A new field, based on hard-won lessons from human insiders

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Decomposing Your Agent



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Collecting Telemetry



Identifying Risk

You now have audit trails!

- Who's doing what?
- Are your policies being followed?

Finding harder risks

- Is your **human** or **agent** compromised?
- Behavior **out of context** for role or diverged?
- **Low and slow** attacks (too hard for guardrails)
- **Unusual usage** patterns (human abusing agent?)
- Unusual **agent response patterns** (hijack, malfunction?)
- Rate **spike** (DoS, hijack)

Real Customer Snapshot



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Monitor what your AI Agents are doing



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Investigation Summary | Analyst Assistant

Summary:

This case involves the "agent-email-bot" user exhibiting a series of concerning activities over approximately 8 hours. Initial detections indicate a new AI-to-AI activity and the receipt of a first-time email from an unfamiliar domain. Subsequently, a suspicious executable was run, followed by an AI guardrail violation. Most critically, the bot modified the mailbox permissions of an executive user, Rhiannon Powell, configured an inbox rule to forward emails to an external domain (ktenergy.co), and performed a "SendOnBehalf" operation. The activity culminates with an "anomalous internal mail" security alert. These events suggest a potential compromise of the "agent-email-bot" account, leading to unauthorized access and potential data exfiltration.

Analysis:

Threat Classification: Compromised Insider

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Questions

Thank You